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Welfare Litigation, the Eleventh
Amendment and State
Sovereignty: Some Reflections
on Dandridge v. Williams
Melvyn R. Durchslag*
The eleventh amendment has, for the most part, permitted the states to
insulate themselves from claims of private citizens asserted in federal courts.
The author posits that the eleventh amendment policies of preservation of
state sovereignty and maintenance of a federal system may underlie and
help explain recent court decisions in cases involving social welfare programs, notwithstanding that these cases were ostensibly decided on equal
protection grounds. The author concludes that ifpersons litigating issues
involving the appropriation or allocation of state dollars are sensitive to
eleventh amendment considerations, confining equal protection interpretations might be avoided.

ON MARCH 25, 1974, the United States Supreme Court decided
Edelman v. Jordan,' the latest in a recent series of cases in
which the Court has determined the extent to which the eleventh
amendment insulates the states from claims of private citizens asserted in federal courts. Edelman, however, was somewhat unlike
previous cases, in that the eleventh amendment issue was presented
in the context of a joint federal-state program of public assistance,
a scheme described as one of "cooperative federalism. 3 On its
facts, Edelman was neither a terribly interesting nor thoughtprovoking case. Indeed, it was one which those of a more conservative bent might opine ought not be in the federal courts at all.
Essentially, the claim was that Illinois public assistance regulations and the interpretation placed on them by state administrators
violated federal requirements on aid for the aged, blind, and disabled. 4 The district court found for the plaintiffs and was affirmed
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School.

B.S. (1962),

J.D. (1965), Northwestern University.
1. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department
of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S.
184 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
3. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
4. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1973) provided that the state must make determina-
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by the Seventh Circuit.5 Had the district court merely invalidated
the state regulations, Edelman might never have reached the Supreme Court. What made the case controversial was that portion
of the district court's order requiring that the State of Illinois pay
benefits retroactively to all aid recipients shortchanged by the Illinois regulations whose applications for assistance were filed between July 1, 1968, the date on which the federal regulation was
adopted, and April 16, 1971, the date on which the district court
entered its preliminary injunction. In affirming, the court of appeals
relied in part upon prior decisions affirming similar orders 7 and in
part upon its own independent analysis of the eleventh amendment,
and rejected, at the same time, the reasoning of three other decisions.8 The Supreme Court reversed.
The underlying rationale which prompted that reversal might also
explain, at least in part, the Court's decisions in Dandridge v. Wil-

tions on applications for aid to the aged and aid for the blind within 45 days from the
date of application. Thus if the applicant was found qualified the first check had to
have been received by the 45th day after application was made, and that check had
to include all aid due measured from the time of application. Section 4004.1 of the
Illinois Categorical Assistance Manual was more restrictive as to time, allowing only
30 days for approval of aid to the blind and the aged. However, aid was limited to the
amount due during the month in which the application was approved. Thus, if an
applicant applied for aid on the 15th day of the month, even assuming compliance
with the 30-day approval requirement, an approval on the 10th day of the following
month would result in a check for only 10 days aid.
The past tense is used because the specific issue in Edelman, i.e. aid to the blind,
disabled, and aged, is now moot due to the passage of the 1972 amendments to the
Social Security Act federalizing the three adult categorical assistance programs.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (Supp. II, 1972).
5. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
6. Since being reversed by the Supreme Court in Edelman, the Seventh Circuit has taken a restrictive view of what constitutes a retroactive order. In
Vargas v. Trainor,508 F.2d 485, 490-92 (7th Cir. 1974), the court held that the point
at which the past is separated from the future, for purposes of the eleventh amendment, is the date on which the trial court enters its first order, temporary or permanent.
It was not, as the plaintiffs contended, the date on which the complaint was filed.
A fortiori, the obligation of the state to pay could not extend to the time when the
cause of action accrued-in Vargas, the date of the reduction pursuant to a constitutionally deficient notice.
7. See Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Organization, 409 U.S. 809
(1972), affig Unreported Order (N.D. Ind.); State Dep't of Health v. Zarate, 407 U.S.
918 (1972), aflg 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49
(1969), affig Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), aff'g 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
8. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921
(1973); Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md. 1972); Westberry v. Fisher,
309 F. Supp. 12 (D. Me. 1970).
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liams9 and Jefferson v. Hackney.10 Simply stated, the thesis is
that a federal court will avoid rendering a judgment for plaintiff
when to do so will likely require a state to appropriate additional
dollars. It is further suggested that only when it is required to do
so by specific constitutional or statutory provisions will a court step
in and render a decision adverse to a state's financial interest."
This is neither a new nor an original thesis; Professor Robert
Bennett articulated it very well in a recent article, stating:
In cases involving the allocation of government spending,
courts tend to be especially reluctant to side with the recipients . .

.

. That

reluctance

seems

to grow

. . .

where

. . .the motivation for state action is unwillingness to
spend more, and the thrust
2 of the recipients' claim is to require that more be spent.'
The eleventh amendment as interpreted in Edelman may provide
some clue as to why this might be so.
II
The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution has
been a patchwork of judicial interpretation, reinterpretation, and
confusion. Since the task of trying to make sense of this oftenforgotten amendment has been more than adequately accomplished
by others, 3 an extended analysis will not be undertaken here. To
illustrate the thesis, however, it is appropriate to explore briefly
the events which resulted in the adoption of the eleventh amendment
and the interpretation given the amendment by the courts, particularly the Supreme Court.
Article III of the United States Constitution, which vests the federal government with judicial power, provides inter alia that the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction "[i]n all cases af9.
10.
11.
12.
(1973).
13.

397 U.S. 471 (1970).
406 U.S. 535 (1972).
See notes 127-48 infra and accompanying text.
Bennett, Liberty, Equality and Welfare Reform, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 74, 99

See, e.g., C.E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY (1972); Mathias, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation,

2 GA. L. REV. 207 (1968); McCormack, IntergovernmentalImmunity and the Eleventh
Amendment, 51 N.C.L. REV. 485 (1973); Comment, Implied Waiver of a State's
Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 1974 DUKE L.J. 925; Note, A Practical View of the
Eleventh Amendment Lower Court Interpretationand the Supreme Court Reaction,
7 GA. L. REV. 366 (1973); Note, Edelman v. Jordan: A New Stage in Eleventh
Amendment Evolution, 21 KAN. L. REV. 429 (1973); 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 496
(1975); 26 VAND. L. REV. 633 (1973); cf. Comment, Suits Against State Officials:
Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 85 (1974).
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fecting Ambassadors . . .and those in which a State shall be a
party." 14 In addition, the judicial power of the United States is
extended to all cases arising under the Constitution, the laws of the
United States and treaties; to controversies between two or more
states; to controversies between a state and citizens of another state
and between a state and citizens of foreign states. 5 Interestingly,
there was little debate in the Constitutional Convention over the need
for the creation of a federal judiciary or for the extension of federal
judicial power to those matters which were related to foreign affairs
or to the preservation of domestic harmony between the several
states. What little debate there was concerned the ability of Congress to create lower federal courts possessing full judicial power
and the inclusion within that judicial power of cases where there
was diversity of citizenship. 16 The debate over whether federal
courts ought to have power to adjudicate disputes between a state
and citizens of another state appears to have surfaced as a result of
antifederalist sentiments articulated in state ratification conven7
tions.'
The reasons for antifederalist concern about this grant of power
were varied. Certainly, in part, the concern reflected the states'
financial condition at the time of the Constitution's ratification
and the fear that states would be held accountable for debts owing
to noncitizens. 8 On hindsight, it is arguable that the fear was unjustified. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was, after all,
firmly established in England at the time of the Constitution's
adoption,' 9 and some evidence exists that it was an integral part
of the jurisprudence of the states during the period of confederation.20 Yet, what the Constitution created was a new government,
one to which the states had ceded certain sovereign powers. That
14.
15.

U.S. CONST. art. III,
Id.

§

2.

16. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE
154-59 (1926); H. HART & H. WECHSLER,

STATES

CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED

THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM 3-21 (2d ed. 1973); JACOBS, supra note 13, at 15-19; C. WARREN, THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION

531-47 (1928).

17. JACOBS, supra note 13, at 27-40. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 507-09
(H. Lodge ed. 1902) (A. Hamilton). Interestingly, while the Federalist Papers are
often cited as an authoritative interpretation of the Framers' intent, these papers were
actually published after the Constitutional Convention in order to counteract the
statements of the Antifederalists and thereby influence the outcome of the state (especially New York) ratification conventions.
18. Cf.JACOBS, supra note 13, at 69-71.
19. For a description of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it existed in England in the 18th century, see JACOBS, supra note 13, at 4-8.
20. See, e.g., Nathan v. Virginia, I Dall. 77 (Phila. C.P. 1784); JACOBS, supra
note 13, at 12.
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part of article III which granted federal courts the power to decide
cases when a state was a party could well be interpreted as a pro
tanto renunciation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 2' At
least there was a risk that the federal judiciary would treat it as
such, and because of the independence of the judiciary there would
be little the states could do to prevent such treatment. The answer
of the Federalists was simply to cast the concern as a "red herring."
Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist,22 and John Marshall, at the
Virginia Convention,23 stated that given the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the extension of federal judicial power in article III to
disputes between a state and citizens of another state could only24be
interpreted to mean those disputes where the state was a plaintiff.
Whatever may be said of the Federalist rejoinder, the Supreme
Court, with only Justice Iredell dissenting, did not agree. In
1792, the executor of the estate of a deceased resident of South
Carolina filed an original action in assumpsit against the State of
Georgia in the United States Supreme Court.25 With the exceptions of Justice Wilson and, to a more limited extent, Chief Justice
26
Jay, the majority justices admitted as a general proposition the
21. See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 13, at 24-26. See also Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-65 (1793) (opinion of Justice Wilson). Justice Wilson
viewed the ratification of the Constitution by the states as a ceding of their essential
sovereignty to the federal government, relegating the states to the position of
"princes" with the federal government playing the role of "king". Id. at 458-63.
But cf. JACOBS, supra note 13, at 151-53.
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 17.
23. 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 557 (2d ed. 1836).
24. Why they reached that conclusion, except as a political expedient, is unclear.
To the extent that federal judicial power was extended to cases other than those which
directly involve federal governmental functions such as cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and cases in which the United States is a party, it was to
insure that the integrity of the union and harmony between the states was preserved. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821); Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 466 (1793); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 534-35, 546; C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
SOVEREIGN STATES 31-35 (1924). In terms of the role of an independent federal
judicial system in preserving the harmony of a union of independent states, it should
make little difference if the plaintiff is the state or the individual. To answer the
argument that nothing could be more destructive of the union than a decision by a
"foreign" tribunal affecting the vital interests of a sovereign state, one need only refer
to article III, section 2 of the Constitution, which extends the judicial power to controversies between two or more states. Cf Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419, 466-67 (1793).
25. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
26. Unlike Justice Wilson, Chief Justice Jay appears to suggest that it is the
people, as a collective will, who constitute the sovereign. Since the Constitution is
an expression of the sovereign will of the people, the only question is whether the
language of the document vests the federal judiciary with the power to decide cases
where a state is the defendant. Compare id. at 453-65 with id. at 469-72.
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sovereignty of the individual states, but found that the grant of federal judicial power to controversies between a state and citizens of
27
another state was, pro tanto, an abdication of sovereign immunity.
This decision precipitated the adoption of the eleventh amendment
which deprives federal courts of jurisdiction in any case commenced
against a state by a citizen of another state.28
While many believed that the eleventh amendment merely set
forth with particularity what members of the Constitutional Convention had already perceived, it was not until 1889 that this belief
was confirmed. In Hans v. Louisiana29 a citizen of Louisiana filed
an action in a United States circuit court against the state of his
own citizenship to recover interest accrued on bonds issued by that
state. The plaintiff's argument for the exercise of federal judicial
power was simple-the eleventh amendment by its terms precludes
the exercise of federal judicial power in cases where a citizen of
one state sues another state, but it does not preclude exercise of
that power where a citizen sues his own state if the claim is otherwise within the judicial power.30 Affirming the lower court, 1 the
Supreme Court rejected the argument but its reasons were far from
27. There is at least one strong undeniable fact . . . and that is this, any
one State in the Union may sue another State, in this Court, that is, all the
people of one State may sue all the people of another State. It is plain then,
that a State may be sued, and . . . that suability and state sovereignty are
not incompatible ....
But why should it be more incompatible, that all the
people of a State should be sued by one citizen, than by one hundred
thousand. Id. at 473.
28. For a description of the outcry which followed the decision in Chisholm,
see JACOBS, supra note 13, at 55-57, 64-67. Current learning seems to support the
theory that at the heart of the concern was the potential effect of Chisholm on the
precarious financial condition of some of the states. See, e.g., Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 (1959); Missouri v. Fisher, 290 U.S.
18, 27 (1933); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 390 (1894); Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); JACOBS, supra note 13, at 14, 24, 66; 1
C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91-101 (3d ed.
1937); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1963).
The theory is questionable however, at least from a federal perspective. As
Professor Jacobs points out, the assumption of over 70% of the states' debts by the
federal government made the financial problem moot. Indeed, it may well have been
that fact, coupled with the control of Congress in 1794 by the Federalists, which permitted passage of the amendment. See JACOBS, supra note 13, at 69-72.
The other explanation for the ease with which the eleventh amendment won
congressional approval was that it represented little more than the views of the
drafters of the Constitution in 1787. See id. 67-68, 107; cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 81,
supra note 17.
29. 134 U.S. 1 (1889).
30. Hans was a typical contract clause case; i.e., the plaintiff had purchased
certain coupon bonds issued by the State of Louisiana upon which the state later defaulted.
31. 24 F. 55 (C.C.E.D. La. 1885).
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clear. While Hans has been cited for the proposition that the eleventh amendment precludes a suit in federal court by a citizen against
his own state,32 there is little support for that reading of the opinion.
Rather, Justice Bradley's approving citation of Justice Iredell's
opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia33 and his reliance on the debate surrounding the adoption of article III would seem to suggest that he
based his decision on a more general concept of state sovereignty,
one which inheres in the Constitution itself. It is this principle of
sovereignty, rather than the eleventh amendment, which precludes
the interposition of a federal court in a dispute which is essentially
one between a state and its own citizens, a dispute in which a
federation of sovereign states has only the most marginal of interests.34
32. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of the Dep't
of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 280 (1973); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965); Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944);
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908). Justices Brennan and Rehnquist seem
to be the only members of the court who do not accept this reading of Hans. See
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 556-57 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, supra, at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, however, goes one step
beyond Justice Rehnquist and recognizes no constitutional notion of sovereign immunity apart from that explicitly defined in the eleventh amendment.
33. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429 (1793).
34. Such a suit on state debt obligations [i.e., Hans v. Louisiana] without
the State's consent was precisely the 'evil' against which both the Eleventh
Amendment and the expanded immunity doctrine of the Hans case were
directed. Here, for the first time in this Court, a State's claim of immunity
against suit by an individual meets a suit brought upon a cause of action
expressly created by Congress.
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964) (emphasis added). It is interesting
that Mr. Justice Brennan, the author of the Court's opinion in Parden, makes no
mention of the theory espoused in his later dissent in Employees-that the eleventh
amendment does not preclude a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction in a suit
against a state by one of its own citizens. Rather, his majority opinion rests on
waiver of immunity.
The notion that, apart from the eleventh amendment, the Constitution compels a
decision such as Hans finds an analogy in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
and its progeny. See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1958). But cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Among other examples of federal judicial reluctance to interfere with matters of
primary concern to the state are the so-called "Burford-type" abstention cases, so
named for Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). These cases rest on the
notion that "it is in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise
their discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful independence of state
governments in carrying out their domestic policy." Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294
U.S. 176, 185 (1935).
See also Martin v. Creary, 360 U.S. 219, 224 (1959);
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 350 (1951); Great Lakes
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35
Congressional reaction to the landmark case of Ex parte Young
further illustrates the concern over federal judicial incursions into
state sovereignty. The reaction was not based on the precise holding of Young. The legal principle Young established, that the eleventh amendment is no bar to a suit in federal court against a state
officer, as opposed to the state itself, was certainly not new.36 The
theory of Young and those cases which preceded it is that a state
officer acting pursuant to an unconstitutional statute is not acting
as the "alter ego" of the state, but rather as a private wrongdoer.37
While that theory is conceptually less than satisfying, the fiction
which it created was sufficient to overcome any problem of federal
judicial usurpation of state sovereignty. Nor was the reaction based
upon any harm to the state's fiscal integrity. The fact that the
Young decision prevented the Attorney General from collecting
fines through criminal proceedings in state court represented at most
an indirect threat to the state treasury. It had previously been held
that this kind of indirect threat was not prohibited by the eleventh
amendment. 38 Indeed, if one were to compare the potential harm
to the state treasury from the inability to collect taxes with that
which might occur from the inability to collect fines after conceivably
protracted litigation, the former is certainly more harmful than the
latter and thus arguably more likely to be held subject to the eleventh ariendment proscription.
Young provoked congressional reaction because it involved a preliminary injunction issued against the Minnesota Attorney General
prior to any determination on the merits of the constitutionality of
the statute under which he proceeded and because the order was
issued by a single federal lower court judge. The latter concern, in
particular, renewed the arguments raised some one hundred years
before against congressional power to establish lower federal courts.
These arguments reflected the fear that a profusion of lower federal courts possessing the full judicial power of the United States

Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 298 (1943). See generally 3 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 23.18, at 374-84 (1958). Unlike Erie, however, these cases
cannot reasonably be said to rest on anything but comity.
35. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
36. See, e.g., Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894);
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
203 (1872). But see Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899); In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886). For an excellent review of the
earlier cases see Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV.

345 (1930).
37. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 282 (1884).
38. Id. at 297. But cf. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 502 (1887).
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might have a potentially inhibiting effect on the states' right to determine their own affairs without outside interference.39
The thesis that federal courts are a potential threat to state
sovereignty derives additional support from Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,40 a suit originally commenced in a federal district court to recover sales taxes allegedly assessed illegally. The
case is interesting because the Ford Motor Company proceeded
exactly according to the procedure set forth by the State of Indiana
to recover sales taxes, with one exception: Ford sued in federal
court, not state court. Essentially the issue was whether, once the
state legislature had waived sovereign immunity with respect to
orders of its own courts, there remained any reason under the eleventh amendment to hold that they had not also waived sovereign
immunity with respect to orders of federal courts. While on first
impression it might appear that the State of Indiana would care
little from which side of the street an order compelling payment
might come, the United States Supreme Court thought differently.
Citing the earlier case of Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read,4'
the Court in Ford Motor Co. held that: "When a state authorizes
a suit against itself to do justice to taxpayers . .. it is not consonant with our dual system for federal courts to be astute to read
the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts. 42
Admittedly, it is somewhat difficult to argue that Ford Motor
rests on basic notions of sovereignty which transcend the eleventh
amendment. Ford Motor was a "pure" eleventh amendment case
in the sense that it was a suit directly against a state commenced by
a foreign corporation, or, in eleventh amendment parlance, a suit
"against one of the United States by [a citizen] of another State."
Yet the eleventh amendment is not a bar to a state's being sued;
it is merely a bar to suing a state without its consent. 4' Thus, unless there was something about the nature of the court in which the
action was brought and the relationship of that court to the workings of state government, there would appear little reason for the
court not to have implied a waiver, since the state had expressly
authorized suits to recover sales taxes, albeit in state court.
39. For an historical analysis of the congressional debate which occurred after
the decision in Ex parte Young, see Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 108-10 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); H. HART & H. WECHSLER,
supra note 16, at 46; JACOBS, supra note 13, at 146-49; C. WARREN, supra note 16,
at 930-37.
40. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
41. 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
42. 323 U.S. at 465.
43. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964).
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Ten years later, the Court in Parden v. Terminal Railway44 did
imply a waiver of sovereign immunity in circumstances where Alabama statutes did not expressly waive sovereign immunity. Some
20 years after Congress enacted the Federal Employers Liability Act
(FELA) 45 the State of Alabama began operating an interstate railroad. The plaintiff, an employee of that railroad, was injured on the
job and brought suit in federal district court pursuant to the FELA
to recover for his injuries. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court, which had decided that since the railroad was owned and
operated by the state, the eleventh amendment barred the plaintiff's
suit.
It is difficult to isolate the Court's precise rationale, particularly
in light of its decision some nine years later in Employees of the
Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public
Health & Welfare,46 an action to recover for overtime pay pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).47 Certainly, the decision
was not based on the syllogism underlying Parden, that since the
FELA was passed pursuant to Congress' commerce clause powers
and since those powers are plenary, the states, by ratifying the Constitution, waived their sovereign immunity with respect to any liability which might attach as a result of congressional exercise of those
commerce clause powers. The Fair Labor Standards Act was also
an exercise of congressional commerce power, but the Supreme
Court did not follow its reasoning in Pardenand reached an opposite
conclusion in Employees.48 . Indeed, with a bit of strain the same
syllogism can be said to apply to any constitutional provision which
acts as a general prohibition on the states, viz, that since the states
have by the contract clause relinquished any power they might have
had to abrogate their contractual commitments and since article III
44.

Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).

45. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
46. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (Supp. II, 1972).
The specific provisions which created the controversy in Employees were sections
3(d) and 3(f) which extended coverage to include employees of a political subdivision
assigned to tasks in a hospital, institution, school, or certain public transportation
facilities. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601,80 Stat. 830,
amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1964), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (Supp. II, 1972).
48. It is true that, as the Court said in Parden, "the States surrendered a
portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regu-

late commerce." 377 U.S. at 191. But we decline to extend Pardento cover
every exercise by Congress of its commerce power, where the purpose of
Congress to give force to the Supremacy Clause by lifting the sovereignty
of the States and putting the States on the same footing as other employers

not clear.

Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1973).
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confers federal judicial power in all cases arising under the Constitution, the federal courts therefore possess the power to adjudicate a
dispute between a citizen and his state based on the contract clause.
That was, in essence, the argument made in Hans v. Louisiana and
it failed.49
Conceivably, the syllogism failed in Hans but succeeded in
Parden because Congress had not acted in the former while it had in
the latter. This interpretation would certainly be consistent with
the dictum of the circuit court in Hans, that waiver is a political
question. 50 Yet that does not explain why the Court refused to respect that political decision in Employees. The amendment to the
Fair Labor Standards Act which precipitated the Employees litigation was clearly intended to apply to employees of state and local
governments,5' while the Parden Court had to interpret the FELA
by way of analogy to other federal statutes in order to find its
application to the states.52

49. While the contract clause cases suggest the primacy of the eleventh amendment, Professor Jacobs suggests that Ex parte Young may well indicate that where
the eleventh and fourteenth amendments conflict, an accommodation will be effected in favor of the fourteenth. See JACOBS, supra note 13, at 142-43.
50. [A]nd where, as here, the object of the suit is the recovery of money,
courts would be without any means of enforcing the judgment without an
assumption of those powers which, in accordance with the checks and
balances and distribution of powers in all well-constituted governments,
are unchangeably andforever political,and not judicial.
Hans v. Louisiana, 24 F. 55, 68 (C.C.E.D. La. 1885) (emphasis added).
51. The language to that effect could not be clearer. See 29 U.S.C. § 203
(1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (Supp. II, 1972). For the majority, however,
that did not end the inquiry. Justice Douglas went on to try to mesh the language of
the FLSA with the eleventh amendment by querying whether a private right of
action was necessary to the statutory scheme. Finding that the act permitted the
Secretary of Labor to bring suit for amounts due the employees, the Court concluded
that Congress did not intend to deprive the states of immunity from suit in a federal
forum. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1973). It is important to contrast this conclusion with that reached by the Court in the welfare area. In Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397, 406, 420 (1970), the Court rejected the contention that primary jurisdiction barred judicial intervention in a conformity dispute and permitted a private right
of action to be maintained, since HEW had no procedures whereby welfare recipients
could trigger and participate in the department's review of state welfare programs.
See notes 149-66 infra and accompanying text (discussion reconciling claims of
statutory nonconformity with the eleventh amendment).
52. The language within the FELA upon which the Court's claim of congressional intent rested was the word "every" appearing before the phrase "common
carrier by railroad." The Parden Court reached to similar language in the Federal
Safety Appliance Act and the Railway Labor Act to conclude that the FELA was meant
to cover state-owned railroads. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1964). This is to be distinguished from the decision in Employees which appeared
instead to reach for a reason not to apply a private right of action under the FLSA.
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Finally, the distinction drawn by Pardenbetween an FELA case,
where the claim is created by a federal statute, and the more normal
case, where the claim is created by state law, is difficult to justify
after Employees. Both the Fair Labor Standards Act and the FELA
create the wrong and provide the remedy.53 The distinction makes

even less sense when viewed in light of the decision in Edelman.
There the wrong was clearly a federal wrong in the sense that state
law permitted what federal law prohibited. Add to that the fact
that the remedy for that wrong was federal,54 and the distinction
between federal wrong-remedy and state wrong-remedy vanishes.
That leaves as the only realistic distinction between Parden
and Employees the timing of the enactment of the federal statute
and the state activity which is used to provide the operative fact
of implied waiver. In Parden the federal legislation predated the

state's activity and in Employees it postdated that activity.5

Ac-

cepting, in this context at least, that implied waiver must be founded
upon a sequential conjunction of congressional demand and state
activity,56 the distinction makes sense. But what about Edelman?
At least on its face, the fact that the state in Edelman continued
to request and receive federal funds knowing of the federal regula-

tion and of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act would seem to provide the conjunction required by Parden but absent in Employees.
However, notwithstanding the Court's equivocation,57 the question did
53. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (Supp. II, 1972), is a comprehensive statute setting forth all elements
of the claim including contributory negligence, assumption of risk, survival of action in the event of death of the injured party, and the applicable statute of limitations. Like the FELA, the FLSA sets a standard of conduct for employers covered
by the legislation and provides the mechanism whereby an aggrieved employee may
enforce that standard of conduct by way of an action for damages.
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
55. In at least one case the point at which the state entered the activity was
deemed to be controlling. See Forman v. Community Serv., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246,
1256 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub noma., United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
56. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974); Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Comment, Implied Waiver of a
State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 1974 DUKE L.J. 925, 956-58, 960.
57. The majority in Edelman seems somewhat confused about whether the
problem was that the state by its actions had not consented and thus had not
waived its eleventh amendment protection, or, alternatively, whether the problem
was that Congress, in the Social Security Act, had failed to create a claim upon
which waiver could be founded. At one point the Court, quoting from Great N. Life
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944), articulates that the state must make a
clear declaration of its intention. In the very next paragraph, however, the Court
states there is nothing in the Social Security Act to imply a private right of action.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674 (1974).
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not appear to be whether or not the state's action could have
amounted to an implied waiver. Illinois' decision to participate in
the adult categorical assistance programs was an act of waiver at
least as decisive as Alabama's decision to operate an interstate
railroad. Rather, the decision turned on whether there had been the
required congressional determination that a condition to state participation in the program was its consent to be sued in a federal
court, a waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity." Of the dissenters only Justice Marshall directly addressed this point.59 Marshall argued that a congressional purpose of subjecting the state toredress in federal court could be implied from section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act and HEW regulations 6° requiring corrective retroactive payments upon the decision of a hearing officer that benefits
had been wrongfully withheld. Continued participation by the state
in the categorical program implied a waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity.
There are two responses to Justice Marshall. First, Parden did
not imply anything from the federal legislation except to the extent
that one can describe statutory interpretation as statutory implication. Thus, if the rationale of Parden is that the state entered an
activity with full knowledge of the consequences, that rationale is at
best strained when applied to Edelman. Second, and more importantly, Justice Marshall ignored Ford Motor. Even if one accepts
the argument that continued participation in a federally assisted
program (which, by regulation, requires the state to pay retroactive
benefits after an unfavorable decision by a hearing officer) constitutes
a waiver of liability for retroactive benefits, it is impossible to extend that waiver to a suit against the state in federal court without
rejecting the notion of state sovereignty implied in Ford Motor.
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act was the way out of this dilemma,

58. "But in this case the threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a
class of defendants which literally includes States is wholly absent." Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974). Accord, Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur
County, 482 F.2d 361, 365 (1973).
59. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 690-93 (1974). Justice Douglas, the
author of the Employees majority opinion, argued in dissent that the Court had
already determined that an award of retroactive welfare benefits was not a violation of the eleventh amendment. See id. at 682-83. At best, then, the majority was
untrue to the rule of stare decisis. At worst, the states, knowing of these decisions,
waived their eleventh amendment rights by continued participation in the public
assistance programs. Mr. Justice Brennan, also in dissent, reiterated his position
in Employees, that the eleventh amendment bars the exercise of federal jurisdiction
only in cases instituted against a state by citizens of another state. Id. at 687.
60. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(18) (1974).
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but that section, like the fourteenth amendment, paints with too
broad a brush.
That, however, merely explains the result. Why not take the step
which Justice Marshall took-that of implying not only the state's
consent but the federal mandate as well? One answer may well
be found in the nature of the activity in which the state is engaged.
Justice Marshall, apparently picking up Justice Douglas' language in
Employees,6' perceived the Court's decision as resting, at least in
part, on the old distinction between governmental and proprietary
interests. 62 That may have missed the point. Indeed, in the context of federal-state relationships it is arguable that a greater affront to state sovereignty occurs by a federal intrusion in state
proprietary functions than by a similar intrusion in state governmental functions. 63 Rather, the more appropriate question is whether the activity is something in which, for one reason or another,
it is important to maintain the state's participation. In Employees
the activity was a state hospital. Had Employees gone the other
way, the State of Missouri might well have decided that it could
no longer afford to operate state hospitals and still maintain the same
level of services as previously offered. This would leave the provision of health care solely or substantially to the private sector
which may have been incapable, at least in the short run, of assuming the burdens placed upon it. The application of this concept
to a case like Edelman does not necessarily suggest that a contrary
ruling would have sent the states scurrying from categorical grantsin-aid. Politically that is a doubtful alternative. However, that
political reality does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that federal courts ought to adopt rulings which might well affect the level
of state participation in an activity of such societal importance as
insuring that the poor do not starve to death.

61. 411 U.S. at 279, 284 (1973).
62. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 695-96 (1974). The so-called governmental-proprietary distinction seems to have been noted first by Justice Brewer in
Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 390 (1894). At issue was
whether, in an action against a state officer which had no direct effect on the state's
treasury, the state was the real party in interest. In his dissent in Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 549-59 (1975), Mr. Justice Rehnquist discussed the governmental-proprietary distinction in his disapproval of what he found to be a toosweeping acceptance of federal regulation of Ohio's maximum salaries.
63. Certainly, if one accepts Justice Brewer's definition of proprietary interest
as being a fiscal interest and if one further accepts the notion that the eleventh
amendment was designed to protect the states' treasuries, it would follow that the
most direct affront to the eleventh amendment would be a case which involved a
potential injury to a state's fisc. But cf. JAcoBs, supra note 13, at 134-35.
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Even if one accepts the governmental-proprietary distinction as
controlling, the same result is reached. To the extent that a "governmental" program can be defined as one which is typically, if not
exclusively, a public sector venture, federal court intrusions represent a somewhat more direct affront to state sovereignty than similar
intrusions into activities which are not typically public. This is so
because the reason for the intrusion in the latter instance is generally a desire to regulate an activity in which the public as well as
the private sector happens to be engaged. In the former instance,
soverhowever, the intrusion can only result from the desire of one
64
eign to conform the policies of another sovereign to its own.
Thus, if anything can be gleaned from Parden, Employees, and
Edelman, it is the sensitivity of the Court to the nature of the state's
activity which is the subject of the litigation and the effect of the
Court's interposition on the state's desire and ability to continue
that activity. Edelman, however, is the only public assistance case
in which the Supreme Court has directly faced the eleventh amendment issue 65 because it is the only such case in which a direct order
64. See generally the following language of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).
There are, of course, State activities and State-owned property that partake
of uniqueness from the point of view of intergovernmental relations.
These inherently constitute a class by themselves. Only a State can own a
Statehouse; only a State can get income by taxing. These could not be
included for purposes of federal taxation in any abstract category of taxpayers without taxing the State as a State. But so long as Congress
generally taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned and not uniquely
capable of being earned only by a State, the Constitution of the United States
does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls also on a state.
See also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547-48 (1975); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 198-99 (1968).
65. But see note 7 supra. The Edelman majority, however, refuses to recognize
that the Court treated the eleventh amendment contentions as a substantive, or indeed substantial, issue. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974). A
multitude of lower federal courts, however, have dealt with the eleventh amendment question. See, e.g., Anderson v. Graham, 492 F.2d 986, 991-92 (8th Cir.
1973) (retroactive benefits denied); Owens v. Roberts, 377 F. Supp. 45, 56-59
(M.D. Fla. 1974) (retroactive benefits granted); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp.
798, 805 (D. Mass. 1973) (retroactive benefits denied, but not for eleventh amendment); Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 216-18 (D.N.H. 1973), afl'd, 501 F.2d
1244 (1st Cir. 1974), vacated, 420 U.S. 1000 (1975) (retroactive benefits denied);
Doe v. Flowers, 364 F. Supp. 953, 956 (N.D.W.Va. 1973), af'd, 416 U.S. 922
(retroactive benefits denied); Hurley v. Van Lare, 365 F. Supp. 186, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd., 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd and vacated, 421 U.S. 338 (1975)
(retroactive benefits denied); Mothers' & Children's Rights Organization, Inc. v.
Stanton, 371 F. Supp. 298, 306 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (retroactive benefits denied, but not
for eleventh amendment); Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854, 862-64 (D.R.I. 1973)
(ruling deferred); Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123, 127 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (retroactive benefits granted); Young v. Harder, 361 F. Supp. 64, 77 (D. Kan. 1973)
(retroactive benefits granted); Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147, 1152 (N.D. Il1.
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against the state treasury was issued.66 However, since most public
assistance cases at least indirectly affect the amount of state funds
and the manner in which those funds are administered, the major
question is whether the underlying principles of the eleventh amendment cases carry over to those public assistance cases in which the
eleventh amendment is inapplicable under the doctrine of Ex parte
Young.
III
If one were to measure success by a win-lose record, recipients
of public assistance have been rather successful in the Supreme
Court, having lost only six cases.67 Of those six, two, Dandridgev.
Williams and Jefferson v. Hackney, are particularly appropriate for
analysis in the light of principles of state sovereignty. In both cases
the plaintiffs questioned the manner in which a state allocated its
own as well as federal resources among its citizens. In neither
case was there found to be any congressional mandate which would
have required the state to allocate these resources in a different
fashion. Thus the question in both cases was whether the Consti68
tution alone required a different allocation of state resources.
Maryland, like some twenty other states, imposed a so-called maxi1973) (supplemental opinion), modifiedon appeal,499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), vacated,
420 U.S. 1000 (1975) (retroactive benefits granted); Machado v. Department of Health
& Rehabilitative Serv., 357 F. Supp. 890, 893-94 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (retroactive benefits
denied, but not because of eleventh amendment); Jen Cuk v. Brian, 355 F. Supp. 133,
135 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (retroactive Lenefits granted); cf. Bermudez v. Department of
17,825 (D.C. Ct. App.
Agriculture [1972-74 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
1973) (retroactive benefits granted in Food Stamp Program).
66. While the nominal defendant was the Director of the Illinois Department
of Public Aid, it was clear that the retroactive payments ordered by the district
court would not be paid by the defendant personally, but rather by the State of
Illinois.
67. Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
68. In Dublino, Burns, and Edelman the only substantive, programmatic issue
to which the Court addressed itself related to the conformity of a state statute or
regulation to Title IV of the Social Security Act. Wyman, while involving a
constitutional question, is sui generis to most welfare litigation either before or
after its decision, since it involved not the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, but the fourth amendment as applied through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Although hidden by the Court, the real question in
Wyman was whether the home visit, as conducted, was a reasonable means of
determining eligibility. Thus, unlike Dublino and Burns, Wyman did not involve an
eligibility requirement qua eligibility requirement. Additionally, unlike Dandridge
and Jefferson, it did not involve a scheme which provided differential payments for
arguably similarly situated persons.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:60

mum family grant on eligible recipients of Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC). To determine those families eligible for aid, Maryland
determined a standard of need or minimum subsistence which varied
according to the size of the family and the kind of housing available. 69 However, rather than paying the full amount of determined
subsistence to each family, the state, in order to conserve state
funds,7 ° established a maximum which a family could receive regardless of its actual need. Thus, a family of five living in the city
of Baltimore would receive $250.00 per month as would a family of
nine, even though the state-determined need for a family of nine
was $296.15. This resulted in smaller families receiving 100 percent
of their state-determined minimum subsistence while larger families
were receiving a lesser percentage, the exact percentage reduction
depending upon the size of the family.
This disparity was alleged to be a violation of the Social Security
Act in that (I) those children born into a family already having five
or six children-the exact line of demarcation being unclear-were
totally deprived of aid, and (2) the maximum grant encouraged parents with large families to farm their children out to other relatives
defined by the statute to be eligible custodial recipients. In addition, the maximum grant was argued to be a violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in that it classified
children based solely upon the size of the family into which they were
born.7 The district court after a rehearing determined that while
the maximum grant may not have violated the Social Security Act
because of its apparent approval by Congress, 72 there was, as a constitutional matter, no rational basis for the maximum grant or the
resulting disparate payment other than the state's desire to save
69. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 488 (1970).
70. The argument in the Supreme Court was not based on the conservation of
state funds as it was in the lower court. See Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp.
450, 454 (D. Md. 1968): "The purpose of the maximum grant regulation is solely
to conserve state funds ......
(emphasis added). The state's supporting arguments in the Supreme Court were, in large measure, shaped by the Court's decision
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968), which held that a state may not justify
an otherwise invidious discrimination on fiscal grounds. Letter from George W.
Liebmann, former Maryland Asst. Attorney General, to author, August 13, 1974.
71. The plaintiffs, in an apparent attempt to make Dandridge more closely
approximate Shapiro v. Thompson, raised a so-called fundamental right argument,
the right to procreation. Only Justice Marshall, in dissent, thought the argument
worthy of mention, but even he rejected it summarily. 397 U.S. at 520 n.14.
72. See Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450, 464-67 (D. Md. 1968). In
its simplest form, the argument was that congressional mention of the maximum
grant in the 1967 amendment to the Social Security Act [now 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23)
(Supp. II, 1972)] was a sufficient basis to assume that Congress meant to approve
maximum grants, at least in the abstract.
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money.

Just a year earlier, the Supreme Court had rejected this

rationale as a justification for "invidious" discrimination."
Discussion of the statutory claims has been adequately provided
by the dissenters.74 It is sufficient to say that the use in the Social
Security Act of the word "individuar 75 to describe the custodial
applicant gives some credence to the majority's characterization
of section 402(a)(10) applying to an eligible family and not to every
child within that family.76 Having decided that nothing Congress
said compelled the state to abandon its maximum grant policy, the
Court reached to economic regulation cases 77 to dispose of the equal
protection claim. It stated that Dandridge, like the economic regulation cases, presented little more than "state regulation in the
social and economic field" and suggested that:
to approve the invalidation of. state economic or social
regulation as "overreaching" would be far too reminiscent
of an era when the court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike down state laws because they

might be unwise, improvident or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought.78

The characterization of the Maryland maximum grant regulation as

little more than a regulation of the conditions under which an optician might fit glasses79 made Dandridge, from a stare decisis perspective at least, an easy case.

The Court certainly received its fair share of criticism for its decision.8 ° But if the opinion can be regarded in a manner unaf73. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1968).
74. Mr. Justice Douglas devoted his entire dissent to statutory arguments.
397 U.S. at 490-508. See also Justice Marshall's dissent, id. at 508-17.
75. Section 402(a)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. II, 1972).
76. It is unclear whether the Court's decision rests on this argument or on
congressional recognition of the maximum grant (see note 72 supra) coupled with
HEW approval of state plans containing maximum grants. The lack of clarity is
created by a somewhat cryptic footnote which sets forth two arguments: I) that
"eligible individuals" means eligible applicants, and 2) that section 402(a)(10),
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. II, 1972), was designed only to prevent waiting lists.
The footnote then goes on to say that "there is considerable support . . . for this
[singular] view," and "we do not find it necessary to consider this [singular]
argument." Id. at 481 n.12 (emphasis added).
77. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911).
78. 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970).
79. This is something of an oversimplification. The majority recognized "the
dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases [see note 76 supra]
and this one." 397 U.S. at 485. These dramatic differences, however, were not
dramatic enough to carry the day.
80. See, e.g., Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare
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fected by the sympathy evoked by starving welfare recipients (a
sympathy not evoked by middle-class opticians), it has some arguable basis even if the rationale for that basis is somewhat obscured
in meaningless rhetoric. The heart of the opinion and the ratio
decidendi for the Court's resolution of the statutory claim as well as
the equal protection claim is the Court's statement that:
Given Maryland's finite resources, its choice is either to
support some families adequately and others less adequately or not to give sufficient support to any family. We
see nothing .. .that forbids a state to balance the stresses
that uniform insufficiency of payments would impose on all
families against the greater ability of large families . ..
to accommodate their need to diminished "per capita payments." 81
This statement may explain the noninterventionist policy of the
Court. However, it does not quite answer why, if in fact the maximum grant worked a discrimination among similarly needy persons,
the Court seemed so reluctant to state that whatever difficult policy
choices the state might have had, they could not be resolved in a
manner which treated equally situated persons differently. Conceivably then, the only question in Dandridge was whether those
treated differently were in fact similarly situated. If they were, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to manufacture a justification
for differential treatment.
It is difficult to conclude that persons are in fact differently
situated merely because one happens to be born into a family of
larger or smaller size than another. This is particularly true in light
of the purpose of the AFDC provision to provide for needy children 2
and the apparent constitutional requirement that any classification
bear a reasonable relationship to the purposes of the statute under
which the classification is created.83 The only answer is to say, as
the Court seemed to, that a family of nine is different from a family
of five in terms of family need and the assets necessary to satisfy
Adjudication, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1, 60 (1970); Comment, Legal Rights of AFDC Recipients After
Rosado v. Wyman and Dandridge v. Williams, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 207 (1971);
Comment, Constitutional Law. The Maximum Welfare Grant, 9 DUQUESNE L. REV.
271 (1970); Redefining Federal Largess Through State Maximum Grant Regulations: Dandridge v. Williams, 4 LOYOLA U.L. REV. (La.) 182 (1971); 35 ALBANY L. REV.
416 (1971); 36 Mo. L. REV. 117 (1971); 23 VAND. L. REV. 1390 (1971).
81. 397 U.S. at 479-80.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
83. For an extensive analysis of the standard of rationality in cases involving
statutory classifications, see Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
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that need. Thus, large families and small families are not similarly
situated. That proposition is, in the abstract, true. Indeed, the
Court recognized that economies of scale may dictate a different
need determination, and, consequently, different payment schedules. 4 Unfortunately, the proposition is largely irrelevant to the
facts in Dandridge. Maryland accounted for economies of scale
in calculating need. 5 However, what was involved in Dandridge
was not need but payment. To relate the Court's argument to payment, one must assume that the family cost-of-living curve becomes
horizontal when the size of a family reaches six. Not only does this
assumption seem incorrect, but it is belied by the state's own needdetermination schedule which presupposed a cost-of-living curve
that proceeded more or less vertically, but at a decreasing rate.
The only other argument which the Court used to justify the
conclusion that the two families were not similarly situated was
that, at the upper end of the family size scale, the amount of the
grant began to approximate the amount which one would receive if
he or she worked 40 hours a week at the minimum wage. Thus,
the problem that public assistance is a disincentive for work was
more likely to arise with respect to a large family than a small
family. Since the argument, at least on its face, makes eminent
sense and because it is irrelevant whether this rationale in fact determined the amount of the maximum grant, 6 there is no reason
that the Court could not accept the argument as a reasonable basis
for differential treatment. The difficulty is simply that the argument
assumes something about the recipients, i.e., that they are employable. To the extent that this assumption is not true, some recipients
are being penalized for something beyond their control. In equal
protection jargon, the statute is overinclusive. Since the courts have
generally been reluctant to accept statutes which are overinclusive, 7
the question arises whether there is some other reason for upholding the maximum grant.
One reason was suggested by Messrs. Tussman and tenBroeck
some 25 years ago:
The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility.
The courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of [social
84. 397 U.S. at 479-80.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 488.
See Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960).
See Tussman & tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 341, 351-53 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1086-87 (1969).
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the liability to

error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the
number of times the judges have been overruled by events
-self-limitation can be seen to be the path to institutional
prestige and stability.88
Thus, there is the problem that the Court has neither objective nor
experiential means of knowing whether what the legislature will
substitute for that which is declared invalid will result in a "better"
world or even in a "better" distribution of public assistance.
Dandridge is a good example of this difficulty. The difference between what Mrs. Williams, the named plaintiff, would have received
were it not for the maximum grant and what she in fact received
was $46.15 per month. For the other plaintiff and her family the
difference was $81.50 per month.89 To one living at bare subsistence, these sums are substantial. The relevant question, however, is from where are the dollars to come. If they are to come
from the vast majority of AFDC recipients, 90 then one might legitimately ask whether it is "better" for all to starve equally than, at
least on a relative basis, for some to live well and others to live less
well.9' This is a far different problem than that involving infringement of specific individual rights. As Tussman and tenBroeck so
aptly stated, "[when] the Court is dealing with human, civil or
individual rights, [a] requirement of 'abstract symmetry' is not quite
so ridiculous.

92

Dandridge may also be explained on the ground that no one was
being absolutely deprived of assistance. Accepting the Court's
characterization, each needy family unit and, thus, each member of
that unit, was receiving some aid. Even assuming a deprivation,
and there is no reason to doubt that one occurred, it was only relative. That is, Mrs. Williams' deprivation would be evident only if
the amount of assistance which she and her family received were
compared to the amount received by a family consisting of four or
five persons. Even then, the deprivation would not be self-evident;
88.

Tussman & tenBroeck, supra note 87, at 373.

See also Gunther, Forewvard:

In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1972); Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REv.
583, 597-98 (1968); Brest, Book Review, 23 STAN. L. REV. 591, 615 (1971).
89. 397 U.S. at 490-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
90. Of the 32,504 AFDC families in Maryland, approximately 92% received what
the state had determined to be minimum subsistence. Id. at 480 n.10.
91. Apart from the policy question, there is also a constitutional question of
whether the equal protection clause demands that kind of economic equality.
Cf.Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
92. Tussman & tenBroeck, supra note 87, at 373.
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the amount of dollars which each family received would have to be
compared with each family's need in order to conclude that Mrs.
Williams suffered a deprivation. This is not to suggest that the deprivation was not real. Indeed, there is little doublt that all recipients of AFDC in Maryland were in some absolute sense financially
deprived. But that may be a due process issue, and the theory on
which Dandridgewas decided was equal protection.93
To carry the analysis one step further, it is not inappropriate for
a court, before interfering with a particular legislative judgment, to
consider the nature and quantum of harm caused by that judgment.
This is what the courts did when they determined that before government entitlements are withdrawn, a governmental body must
justify its decision and, in doing so, certain formalities are required
in the process of making that decision. 94 Recently, the Court has
looked at the extent of the deprivation in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.95 As the Court there stated,
The argument here is not that . . . [some] children . . .
are receiving no public education; rather it is that they are
receiving a poorer quality education . . . . [The] Equal
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. Nor, indeed . . . can any system assure ecIual quality of education except in the most
relative sense. 9'
Rodriguez was admittedly a more difficult case than Dandridge because, in the former there was no definable means or standard from
which one could determine whether or not there was in fact an educational deprivation or its extent, while in Dandridge the state had
determined the minimum level of need. This merely suggests, however, that the Court in Dandridge might have been more comfortable in finding an absolute deprivation. It does not necessarily
mean that deprivation existed in Dandridge any more than it existed
in Rodriguez. Indeed, it may well have been necessary for the
Court in Dandridge to have scrutinized the need determination itself in order to find an absolute deprivation, for it is conceivable,

93. But see Michelman, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969), in which Professor Michelman
argues that there is a basic constitutional assurance of minimum protection.
94. Compare Daniel v. Goliday, 398 U.S. 73 (1970) with Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) and Velazco v. Minter, 481 F.2d 573, 578 (1st Cir. 1973);
Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944
(1972); Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
95. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
96. Id. at 23-24.
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though highly unlikely, that the need standard was set too high for
families with fewer than six members.
Finally, and more appropriately, Dandridge can be analyzed as
reflecting a basic concern over federal court interference with state
sovereignty. As the Court stated in Barbierv. Connolly,
Neither the [fourteenth] amendment . . . nor any other
amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of
the state . . . to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the
people, and to . . . add to its wealth and prosperity . . . . Regulations for these purposes may press
with more or less weight upon one than another, but they
are designed . . . to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good. 97
Barbier involved the constitutionality of a police power regulation
and, while it has been suggested that police power regulations are
entitled to more deference than benefit distribution schemes, 98 no
reason is apparent for such a distinction. Police power regulations
are determinations by state or local governments that certain conditions demand regulation more than other conditions. The same
can be said of benefit distribution programs. A local determination
is made concerning which persons are in need of what resources and
services, and how and to what extent those needs will be met. Indeed, it is arguable that in terms of those concerns which precipitated the adoption of the eleventh amendment, courts ought to give
greater deference to state benefit distribution programs than to state
police power regulations, since the former directly involve state fiscal decisions while the latter involve fiscal decisions only indirectly,
if at all. As applied in Dandridge, Maryland had determined that,
given the amount of money the legislature could realistically appropriate for AFDC, the total number of AFDC recipients, and the proportion of recipients with large families, it would be "better" to
employ a maximum grant than to pay all recipients less than their
state-determined need.
There is nothing specific to which one can point which clearly
establishes the proposition that this kind of decision ought to be as
protected from federal interference as is the decision not to expend
state funds for retroactive benefits. However, the understanding
that the states would, under the Constitution, retain the very same
powers of raising revenues that they had had prior to the Constitu97.

113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885).

98. See Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and
CategoricalAssistance Programs,54 CALIF. L. REV. 567, 640 (1966).
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tion's adoption99 would be somewhat empty without the concomitant power to expend those dollars in a more or less unrestrained
manner. By analogy, then, the opinion of the lower court in
Dandridge'0 0 is like Ex parte Young in terms of federal incursion into state decisionmaking. It was a decision by a lower federal court,
albeit a three-judge court, that a state policy of distribution was unequal and thus unconstitutional without the aid of any appropriate
evidence and without consideration of most, if not all, of the competing policies.
It is true, of course, that the order of the three-judge court
striking down the maximum grant regulation was not a violation of
the eleventh amendment.' O' But as pointed out above, 0 2 the eleventh
amendment does not resolve all sovereignty questions.
This proposition would be clearer had Dandridge not been appealed, or had the Supreme Court affirmed. Maryland would have
then been faced with two choices. It could, contrary to its expressed wishes, have reduced grants to some 140,000 recipients by
approximately 4 percent. 10 3 Yet had Maryland opted instead to
raise the grant of those affected to the maximum grant, the cost to
the state would have been approximately $1,400,000 in additional
appropriations. 104 The entire $1,400,000 would have been state
funds, since any federal matching money due the state under the
statutory formula' 5 had been completely expended.' 6 Thus, while
the lower court's order was injunctive in nature and, unlike
Edelman, prospective only, given Maryland's determination that it
desired to pay subsistence to as many families as possible, its limited
resources, and the funds required for this subsistence, the order
could just as well have been retroactive. This view is supported by
Professor Edward Sparer, a leading welfare rights strategist:
[a] contrary result in Dandridge would have permitted
wholesale challenges to the barriers created by state legislatures and Congress to deny welfare assistance to groups
of needy people. Distinctions between grant levels of individuals in equal need, whether because of differences in
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 185 (H. Lodge ed. 1902) (A. Hamilton).
100. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968).
I01. "We do not hold that Maryland must appropriate additional funds to
support its participation in the program . . . we reiterate our previous holding that
the Eleventh Amendment deprives courts of the United States from [sic] jurisdiction to grant such relief." Id. at 459.
102. See notes 32-43 supra and accompanying text.
103. Brief for Petitioners at 22, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
104. Id.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
106. See note 103 supra.
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categories or their state of residence, might have been
brought down. Traditional divisions between state and
federal authority .. . would doubtless have been altered.
The equal protection clause would have been the main vehicle for establishing a constitutional guarantee of human
life. In these and other ways, affirmative judicial scrutiny
to guarantee equal protection could have led to a different
America. 1o7
In regard to state sovereignty, Jefferson v. Hackney'" was an
even clearer case than Dandridge. The State of Texas allocated different sums of money to individuals in four categorical assistance
programs, even though the State had determined that each individual, regardless of category, had the same dollar need. The aged received 100 percent of their need, the blind and disabled 95 percent
and dependent children and their custodial parents 75 percent. 0 9
The equal protection claim essentially was that once Texas decided to
use a percentage reduction scheme to distribute its public assistance
benefits, it was required to apply that percentage reduction equally
among all needy individuals, whether they be aged, blind, disabled,
or dependent children. The resolution of the equal protection issue
was predictable in view of the previous decision in Dandridge; that
is, if a state can discriminate in the amount of dollars granted to
persons within the same category, it can do so with respect to persons in different categories. Couched in terms of whether or not a
reasonable basis existed for the disparate payments, this is essentially what the Court held: "Since budgetary constraints do not allow
the payment of the full standard of need for all welfare recipients,
the State may have concluded that the aged and infirm are the least
able .. .to bear the hardships of an inadequate standard of living." ' 0 So be it!
However, the Jefferson analysis cannot end there. It does not
take much imagination to hypothesize that the plaintiffs may have
been to some extent playing state politics in federal court. If the
Supreme Court had reversed the district court, Texas would have
been placed in the same position as Maryland had the Court affirmed
Dandridge. It could either have appropriated more money,"' or re107. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 65, 82 (N.
Dorsen ed. 1971), quoted in Krislov, The O.E.O. Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize
a Right to Welfare: A Study in the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 58
MINN. L. REV. 211, 228-29 (1973) (emphasis added).
108. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
109. Id. at 537 n.3.
110. Id. at 549.
111. The appropriation of additional dollars for public assistance in Texas
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duced grants to the aged, disabled, and blind. Indeed, had Texas
decided on the latter alternative, the grant reductions might well
have been substantial since, unlike Dandridge, where the disaffected
represented only 8 percent of the total recipient population, AFDC
recipients in Texas represented approximately 35 percent of all
those who received categorical assistance 12 Because support of
the aged and infirm is politically popular, if one were to anticipate
Texas' decision, the more probable choice would be the appropriation of additional dollars. If that prediction is correct, is there really
very much difference, in fact or effect, between the district court
order in Edelman v. Jordan,'13 and the order requested by the plaintiff in Jefferson? The obvious difference is that in Jefferson the decision would have been made by the state legislature and, to the extent a constitutional amendment was necessary, the citizens of
Texas, and not by the federal court. This preserves at least the
trappings of sovereignty. Looking beyond the obvious, however,
the Court was faced with precisely the same dilemma which it
faced a year later in Rodriguez
In Texas, it has been calculated that $2.4 billion of additional school funds would be required to bring all schools
in that state up to the present level of expenditure of all
but the wealthiest districts-an amount more than double
that currently being spent on education. . . . An amicus
curiae brief . . . claims with some justification each of
presented peculiar problems. Article III, section 51-a of the Texas constitution
limited state expenditures for public assistance to $80,000,000. Id. at 537 n.l.
However, the extent to which this constitutional limitation posed a practical
difficulty is unclear. During the three years between the district court's decision and
the Supreme Court's decision the constitution was in fact amended to allow for
nearly a 400% increase in AFDC payments. Id. at 547 n.16.
Further, the circumstances under which a constitutional amendment would be
required are unclear. Article III, section 51-a states:
[T]hat if the limitations and restrictions herein contained are found to be in
conflict with the provisions of appropriate federal statutes, as they now are
or as they may be amended to the extent that federal matching money is not
available to the state for these purposes, then and in that event the Legislature is specifically authorized and empowered to prescribe such limitations
and restrictions and enact such laws as may be necessary in order that such
federal matching money will be available for assistance and/or medical care
for or on behalf of needy persons.
Thus, had the Supreme Court accepted the plaintiffs' arguments that the Texas
scheme of disproportionate payments to AFDC recipients violated the Social Security
Act, the above-quoted language would seem, on its face, to preclude the necessity of
a constitutional amendment as a precondition to the appropriation of additional
dollars for AFDC.
112. 406 U.S. at 548 n.17.
113. Unreported Order (N.D. Ill. April 16, 1971), cited in Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974).
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would suffer severe financial

Two lower court decisions further illustrate this point. In Henry
v. Betit" 5 the plaintiffs, members of two-parent families, one or both
of whose custodial parents were unemployed, sued to enjoin the
Alaska Commissioner of Health and Welfare from enforcing the
Alaska AFDC statues which made no provision for assistance to the
plaintiffs." 6 Although cast in terms of equal protection, the plaintiffs' arguments are difficult to rationalize in those terms except to the
extent that their claim incorporates a fundamental right to life-an
argument rejected, at least by inference, in Dandridge. The plaintiffs desired to place children and their custodial parents, whose
need and dependency resulted from unemployment, on public assistance even though the Alaska statute made no provision for them.
The three-judge district court dismissed the complaint, citing extensively from the Supreme Court's opinion in Dandridge. Indeed, the
court was imaginative in its efforts to find a rational basis for the
statutory exclusion, suggesting that the classification was reasonably related to effecting a goal of self-support and personal independence by encouraging migration from rural Alaska, where no
employment opportunities existed, to urban Alaska, where these
opportunities were abundant."' Deciding the case on equal protection grounds allowed the court to reject the state's eleventh
amendment argument and hold that, since the plaintiffs' only request was to enjoin prospectively a state officer from enforcing an
unconstitutional statute, they were not requesting a forced appropriation of additional dollars, but merely a reallocation of dollars
already appropriated." 8
Both the state, in relying strictly on the language of the eleventh
amendment, and the court, in accepting that argument literally, misconceived the real import of the plaintiffs' claim. Enjoining the
defendant from implementation of the state's AFDC program would
have been of no value to the plaintiffs; it would have merely termi114. 411 U.S. 1,56-57 n.11l (1973).
115. 323 F. Supp. 418 (D. Alas. 1971).
116. In addition to the AFDC payments authorized to be paid to children
dependent by reason of the "death, continued absence from the home, or physical
or mental incapacity of a parent," 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970), payment may also be
made to children made dependent by reason of the unemployment of one or both
custodial parents. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. II, 1972). For a description of the
"AFDC-UP" program, see Macias v. Finch, 324 F. Supp. 1252, 1256-57 (N.D. Cal.),
aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 913 (1970).
117. Henry v. Betit, 323 F. Supp. 418, 424-25 (D. Alas. 1971).
118. Id. at 421.
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nated aid to all those who were receiving it at the time. Assuming
the plaintiffs to be persons of good will, that certainly was not their
objective. Rather, they were seeking aid for themselves. Thus,
Betit was wholly unlike a case such as King v. Smith, 119 where
striking down the "substitute-father regulation" meant immediate
aid to those harmed by the exclusion. Like the plaintiffs in
Jefferson, the plaintiffs in Betit were betting that, when faced with
deciding between no program or a more inclusive program, Alaska
would opt for the latter. Like Jefferson, the plaintiffs were relying
not on the state legislature-indeed they may have already lost there
-but on a federal district court. Of course, Alaska could have accomplished the goal of an expanded program without appropriating
additional dollars merely by spreading the same appropriation among
a larger class of individuals. But, depending upon how large the
new recipient population was in comparison to the old, a fact not revealed, it may be questioned whether that option was realistic.
Macias v. Finch 20 presented essentially the same issue but in a
somewhat different context. The plaintiffs in Macias were employed full time but their earnings were below the state-determined
standard of need for families the size of theirs. The plaintiffs argued
that to exclude them from public assistance benefits was a violation
of equal protection because they were as needy, if not more so, than
others who were receiving public assistance. As in Betit, the district court relied on the test of rationality propounded by the economic regulation cases and held that a rational basis existed for the
exclusion, since Congress had chosen other means to solve the needs
of the working poor, such as the minimum wage and the right of
collective bargaining. 12 That neither of these solutions seemed to
apply to the plaintiffs did not appear to affect the court in the least.
Nor did the court consider that the effect of the plaintiffs' request
would have required an additional appropriation from the California
legislature.
Betit, Macias, and indirectly Jefferson illustrate the problems of
an excluded class attacking underinclusive benefit programs on
equal protection grounds-they are unable to win except through the
political process which might follow a favorable decision. In these
cases the federal court is being asked to enter an order which will
either create a "worse" world than existed previously or politically
require the states to create a "better" world by appropriating suffi119. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). For a discussion of King v. Smith in the context of
state sovereignty, see notes 150-62 infra and accompanying text.
120. 324 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Cal.), afj'd mem., 400 U.S. 913 (1970).
121. Id. at 1260-61.
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cient additional dollars to include the excluded class in the aid program at a reasonable monetary level. While the latter result is not
specifically prohibited by the eleventh amendment, it still represents
a significant incursion by a federal court into a state's fiscal affairs.
Analytic turmoil results when the courts rely, as they have, on cases
involving economic regulation to decide questions concerning benefit-distribution schemes.
In the economic regulation cases, the plaintiffs are not an excluded but rather an included class. Thus, the question is whether a
reason can be discerned for the state's affirmative act of regulation,
a far different question from that involved in underinclusive benefit
schemes where the question is why the state did not go as far as it
could have. The reason is obvious and has little or nothing to do
with those reasons that the courts manufacture; it is to save
money.122 The states cannot, within given political and fiscal constraints, provide subsistence for all needy persons. A line has to be
drawn somewhere, and where that line is drawn has no relationship
to any objective standard. It might be more appropriate for the
courts to recognize that, if the states were to comply with the plaintiffs' real request, "any incremental cost to the State . . .would
123
be massive."'
While in any given case the immediate result might be the same
whether the Court bases a decision adverse to public assistance litigants on equal protection or state sovereignty grounds, the choice
can make a difference. An equal protection decision like Dandridge
cannot help but have its effect on litigation in the state courts, 1 4 a
problem not encountered when the same decision is founded on
state sovereignty.125 In addition, a decision founded on state sovereignty comes closer to articulating the proper concerns of a federal
court which has been asked to review state resource-allocation decisions. If nothing else, the decision founded on state sovereignty
will better enable public
assistance litigants to know which of many
26
attack.1
to
phantoms
122.

See, e.g., note 69 supra; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 628-29

(1969).
123. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 421 (1970).
124. See Wood v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 481 P.2d 823, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 455, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 931 (1971); Lane v. Harder, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct.
352, 273 A.2d 297 (1970); Holland Motor Express, Inc. v. Michigan Employment
Security Comm'n, 42 Mich. App. 19, 201 N.W.2d 308 (1972); Marlin v. McCorkle,
117 N.J. Super. 465, 285 A.2d 73 (App. Div. 1971); Patino v. Catherwood, 29 N.Y.2d
331, 277 N.E.2d 658, 327 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1971).
125. See Russell v. Dumpson, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP.
20,420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1974) (state court ordering payment of retroactive welfare benefits).
126. One might have concluded after Dandridge that the federal courts had ef-
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IV
If the cases in which public assistance recipients have lost are
analyzed on state sovereignty grounds, it is likewise appropriate to
rationalize on the same grounds cases which they have won. The
latter cases fall into two broad categories: those in which the state's
resource allocation decision contravenes a constitutional guarantee
which transcends general notions of equal protection, and those in
which the state's resource allocation decision contravenes a specific
congressional mandate.
The constitutional issues have been raised in two distinct contexts: those in which a classification has allegedly chilled the exercise of a fundamental right, and those in which the burden of a
state's resource allocation decision has peculiarly fallen on a distinct
and identifiable class of citizens-in the jargon of equal protection,
a "suspect class." In Shapiro v. Thompson 127 the Court held that
to pay welfare benefits to long-term needy residents while denying
those benefits to short-term residents was an infringement of the
right of interstate travel and a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The state's reason for attempting
to limit its public assistance benefits to those residing in the state
for one year or more was to discourage the immigration of indigents
which, consequently, would place a lid on state welfare expenditures.12 8 While recognizing a state's legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of its fisc, the Court nevertheless held that it is
impermissible to accomplish that goal "by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. ' " 9
Some five years later, the Court reaffirmed that position in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,'"0 a case involving the constifectively precluded any substantive review of state social welfare programs. Certainly that was the opinion of some who criticized the reasoning of Dandridge.
See Dienes, supra note 80, at 591-92, 600-12. More recently, however, the Court in
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 539 (1974), provided a new, albeit faint, ray of
hope when it stated that "Dandridge evinced no intention to suspend the operation
of the Equal Protection Clause in the field of social welfare law." The ray is faint
since the context in which the statement was made was jurisdictional, Le., whether
the equal protection claim was "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior
decisions . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit." Id. at 543. Assuming
some discrimination in the manner in which benefits are distributed, a probability
in any social welfare scheme, it would not be difficult to manufacture a plausible
equal protection argument in almost any case, at least for jurisdictional purposes.
Whether the Hagans language can, as a substantive matter, exhume what Dandridge
seems to have buried is quite another question.
127. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
128. Id. at 627-29.
129. Id. at 633.
130. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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tutionality of Arizona's one-year waiting period as a condition for
receipt of free, nonemergency hospital and medical care.13' From
a fiscal perspective, Maricopa County was a more difficult case than
Shapiro since the import of the Court's decision on the state's (in
this case the county's) fisc may have had greater impact. First,
unlike Shapiro, no federal matching aid was available to Maricopa
County to soften the blow of the Court's order. Second, while the
state could comply with the order in Shapiro without additional
expenditures merely by reducing grants pro rata, assuming a certain
level of competence to predict the amount of immigration, a2 it
might be more difficult for a state to comply by reducing either the
quantity or quality of medical care pro rata. Thus, as a practical
matter, the Court's order in Maricopa County may well have required the state to expend more dollars. While it is difficult to determine whether the majority recognized this, 3 3 Justice Douglas may
well have in his concurring opinion:
The legal and economic aspects of medical care are enormous; and I doubt if decisions under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
are equal to the task
34
of dealing with these matters.1
Justice Rehnquist certainly recognized it in his dissent:
Those presently excluded because marginally above the
State's indigency standards, those who may be excluded
in the future because of more stringent indigency requirements necessitated by today's decision, and appellant . . . all have a plausible claim to government-sup-

ported

medical

care.

The

choice

between

them

necessitated by a finite amount of resources . . . would

131. Though one plaintiff argued that the Arizona statute violated his right to
intrastate travel, the Court avoided applying Shapiro to that issue because the
plaintiff, prior to moving to Maricopa County, was a resident of New Mexico, and
had been penalized for his interstate travel. Id. at 255-56.
132. Whether it is possible to measure immigration accurately and use that
measure to predict the level of public assistance payments during any period of
time is open to conjecture. There was no evidence in Shapiro that the states made
any attempt at prediction, even though they argued that they could and did in order
to sustain the residency requirement. 394 U.S. at 634-35. However, it would appear
that relatively accurate prediction is possible. See generally Durham, The Impact
of the Elimination of Residency Laws on Public Assistance Rolls, 4 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 199 (1975).

133. The only indication that the majority recognized the fiscal implications
of its decision was its statement to the effect that any other decision might result
in a severe financial burden being placed on already beleagured private health care
facilities. 415 U.S. at 264-65.
134. Id. at 270.
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. . . have been thought to be a matter particularly within
the competence of the state legislature ...
"'
The answer to the question of why the Court reached a different
result in Shapiro and Maricopa County than in Jefferson and Dandridge is not necessarily the majority's truism in Shapiro-that invidious discrimination is no way to save money. Certainly discrimination existed in both Dandridge and Jefferson. The only reason
it was not invidious discrimination was because the Court chose
not to characterize it as such. Rather, outside the eleventh amendment's specific jurisdictional proscription, the general constitutional
protection of state sovereignty is neither more nor less immutable
than any other constitutional protection; it must be balanced against
other equally weighty considerations to determine the extent to which
it will be respected. In Shapiro and Maricopa County the states'
sovereignty, as manifested by their fiscal integrity and their right to
determine how best to allocate limited resources, was balanced
against an absolute deprivation, possibly resulting in starvation in
37
Shapiro136 or death from debilitating disease in Maricopa County.
While neither the "right" to be free from starvation nor the "right"
to be treated for a debilitating disease is specifically protected by
the fourteenth amendment, 3 both "rights" had a sufficient impact
on other rights that are specifically guaranteed to dictate a balance
in favor of the individual.
A similar approach was taken in Goldberg v. Kelly, 139 where
the Court determined that prior to a termination of benefits a
due process hearing must be held. 40 As in Shapiro, the state cried
135. Id. at 279.
136. "[Tl]he first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid
upon which may depend the ability . . . to obtain the very means to subsist-food,
shelter, and other necessities of life." 394 U.S. at 627.
137. 415 U.S. at 257-62.
138. Cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975) (raising the question of
whether the fourteenth amendment requires adequate treatment of those involuntarily committed to mental institutions). But see, e.g., Michelman, supra note 93.
For a comprehensive but early treatment, see Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental
Illness and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
139. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
140. The essential requirements of due process in the context of welfare hearings
are the recipient's right to present witnesses and to cross-examine adverse wit%nesses, the right to an impartial trier-of-fact (albeit one who may be part of the
local agency structure), the right to have a decision based on the evidence presented,
and the right to be represented by a lawyer or other representative of the recipient's
choice. Id. at 266-71. One unanswered issue, however, was whether the same
requirements apply to a reduction of benefits as apply to a termination of benefits.
See Daniel v. Goliday, 398 U.S. 73 (1970); Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248,
261 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). While the constitutional question remains open, the states
are bound by federal regulation to provide the same hearing rights whether the
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poverty. It argued that the cost of establishing a prior hearing
mechanism and paying conceivably ineligible recipients during the
time it takes for the state to justify its determinations would be
significant. As in Shapiro, the Court stated that "to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of . . . brutal need without a prior hear-

ing of some sort is unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justify it.,' 14 1 Thus, notwithstanding the effect of the Court's
decision on the state's treasury, the balance favored the individual.
In Graham v. Richardson 42 and to a lesser extent in New Jersey
Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill,143 the Court was faced with
public assistance programs which excluded a distinct and insular
class'" of persons. Predictably, the result reached was the same as
in Shapiro and Goldberg, where the issue involved infringement
of a fundamental right. Indeed, the opinions in Graham and Cahill
reflect even less concern for the effect of the Court's decisions on
the state treasury than in Shapiro or Goldberg. This is consistent
with the Court's approach in suspect classification cases where
fiscal considerations, even when directly presented, have been ignored. For example, in Griffin v. County School Board,45 the
Court stated that the federal district court had the power to order
schools which had been closed by the county to be opened.
[T]he District Court may, if necessary to prevent further
... discrimination, require the supervisors . . . to levy
taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate and
maintain . . . a public school system in Prince Edward
County. 146
issue is termination or reduction. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(3) (1974); cf. Thorpe v.
Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969). The question remains, however, whether
any hearing is required when a reduction or termination does not result from facts
peculiar to the individual recipient, but rather from a change in state policy. 45
C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5) (1974) provides that no hearing is required. The restatement
of this regulation by the State of California, CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 22-022.3 (West
Supp. 1973), has been held violative of the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. See Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal.), afl'd mem.
sub nom., Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 924 (1973).
141. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
142. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
143. 411 U.S. 619 (1973). A New Jersey program of "Assistance to Families of
the Working Poor" denied benefits to families with. illegitimate children. It is unclear whether the Court held illegitimacy, like race, to be a suspect classification,
or whether a more traditional rational basis test was used. This equivocation in
cases involving classifications based on legitimacy persists. See, e.g., Jiminez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
144. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 & n.4 (1938).
145. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
146. Id. at 233. It is true that since Griffin involved a not-too-subtle attempt by
the State of Virginia to circumvent a prior federal desegregation order, the
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In contrast to Griffin is the position of the Court in Geduldig v.
Aiello 14 7 where the Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that a
statutory classification in a benefit-distribution program excluded a
class of persons based on gender.148 California adopted a purely
state-funded disability insurance program which excluded normal
pregnancy from its coverage. The Court, relying on Dandridge
and placing heavy emphasis on the state's interest in keeping the individual's cost of disability insurance low, seemed afraid that a
victory for plaintiffs might have required California to apply its own
tax funds to supplement the insurance program to maintain a low
cost:
It is evident that a totally comprehensive program would
be substantially more costly than the present program and
would inevitably require state subsidy, a higher rate of
employee contribution, a lower scale of benefits for those
suffering insured disabilities, or some combination of
these measures. There is nothing in the Constitution,
however, that requires the State to subordinate or compromise its legitimate interests solely to create a more
comprehensive social insurance program than it already
has.
The State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the
self-supporting nature of its insurance program. Similarly, it has an interest in distributing the available resources in such a way as to keep benefit payments at an
adequate level for disabilities that are covered, rather than
to cover all disabilities inadequately. Finally, California
has a legitimate concern in maintaining the contribution
rate at a level that will not unduly burden participating
employees, particularly low-income employees who may
be most in need of the disability insurance.
sovereignty issue might have been of less concern to the Court. It is also true that
Griffin was not a true eleventh amendment case, since the defendant was not the
state, but a county. A county does not stand on the same footing as a state for
purposes of the eleventh amendment. See Lincoln County v. Lunning, 133 U.S.
529 (1890).
147. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
148. The question of whether classification based on gender ought to be treated
as suspect, thus requiring strict scrutiny, has been artfully dodged by the Supreme
Court even when it has clearly been presented with the opportunity to rule on the
question. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See generally
Johnston, Sex Discrimination in the Supreme Court, 1971-74, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV.
617 (1974); Note, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classification and the Definition
of Sex Discrimination,75 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1975); Note, Sex Discriminationand
Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1499 (1971); 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 824 (1973).
149. 417 U.S. at 495-96.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:60

Those cases in which the Court based its decisions in favor of
plaintiffs on nonconformity between a state regulation or statutory
provision and the federal requirements of the Social Security Act
are also reconcilable on grounds of state sovereignty, although the
theories of reconciliation differ. The seminal case is King v.
Smith, 50 in which the Court held that Alabama's so-called substitute-father regulation, 5 ' which defined "parent"2 in a manner
15
inconsistent with the Social Security Act, must fall.
Once one accepts the Court's underlying proposition, that the
Social Security Act alone defines those who are eligible for categorical assistance, there is nothing surprising about a decision holding that a state which receives funds under a federal statute must
conform its requirements to those of the funding act. Any collateral state policies, no matter how legitimate,'53 must be pursued
by means other than those which conflict with federal mandates.
Notwithstanding any indication to the contrary, 5 4 this is still the
law.
From one perspective it is true that the effects of King v. Smith
on state sovereignty in general and the fiscal aspects of sovereignty
in particular are not unlike those which would have followed from a
contrary decision in Dandridge. But King and Dandridgewere dif150. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
151. The effect of the Alabama regulation was to deny assistance to any family
inwhich the mother engaged in extramarital sex. Id. at 313-15.
152. The Court did not articulate the reason for its decision. Presumably, if the
State of Alabama felt strongly enough about its regulation, it could opt out of the
federal program and the regulation might be valid. Cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1970).
But see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334-36 (concurring opinion);
Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31, 38-41 (M.D. Ala. 1967). Subsequent cases, however,
have held that so long as the state participates in the federal program, an inconsistent state regulation must give way to the federal requirement under the supremacy
clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972);
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
153. Alabama argued in King that the substitute-father regulation discouraged
illegitimacy and was consistent with its criminal penalties for fornication.
154. In both Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), and New York Dep't
Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), the Court respected a degree of state discretion
in administering its AFDC program against a claim of conflict with federal dictates.
Wyman did not involve an eligibility condition or indeed any matter on which Congress or HEW had spoken. See note 67 supra. Dublino admittedly involved a state
work-incentive program superimposed on a similar federal program. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 630-44 (Supp. II, 1972). But the Court decided only that assuming no conflict with
the federal program, a supplementary state program can stand.
More recently in Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975) the Court, upholding
Iowa's denial of AFDC benefits to unborn children, held that nothing in the history
of Title IV of the Social Security Act indicated a desire to include the unborn. The
only evidence to the contrary, according to the majority, was an HEW regulation
permitting federal matching funds for unborn children. However, HEW confessed
that the regulation was in error.
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ferent cases, and it is the statutory nonconformity which make them
different. 55 This is not to suggest that the eleventh amendment becomes irrelevant in a categorical grant program, for as the Court
held in Edelman:
The mere fact that a State participates in a program
through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of public
aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the
State to be sued in the federal courts. And while this
Court has

. . .

authorized

suits by one private

party

against another in order to effectuate a statutory purpose,
it has never done so in the context of the Eleventh
Amendment and a State defendant. .

.

. The only language

in the Social Security Act which purports to provide a federal sanction against a State which does not comply with
federal requirements for the distribution of federal
monies

. . .

provides for termination

of future alloca-

tions of federal funds when a participating State fails to
conform with federal law.

This provision . . . falls far

short of a waiver by a5 6-participating State of its Eleventh
Amendment immunity.

King, however, was not a pure eleventh amendment case. The
only issue akin to the eleventh amendment was whether, like
Dandridge, the federal court's interference with Alabama's allocation decision conflicted with general notions of state sovereignty.
The answer is no, for two reasons. First, despite Edelman's holding that state participation in a federal categorical grant program
is not a waiver for eleventh amendment purposes there is in fact a
waiver. The state gives up the right to expend categorical grant
funds in any way it deems appropriate. The very concept of categorical grants assumes that both the federal dollars and the state's
matching dollars will be expended according to congressionally
57
established guidelines.'
Second, because it is Congress which determines that the state is
expending dollars in an inappropriate fashion and the courts are
merely the vehicles by which that congressional dictate is enforced,
155. Both Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall, in their respective dissenting
opinions in Dandridge,attempted to characterize Maryland's maximum-grant regulation as an eligibility condition since arguably any child born into the family after the
fifth or sixth received no aid at all. This characterization would have made the result
in Dandridge a fortiori in view of King v. Smith. The majority simply rejected the
argument out of hand.
156. 415 U.S. at 673-74.
157. See generally Tomlinson & Marshaw, The Enforcement of FederalStandards
in Grant-In-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L.
REV. 600 (1972).
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interference with state allocation decisions is, from an historical
perspective at least, less onerous. Undoubtedly, the most significant debate in the Constitutional Convention was with respect to
whether the small states or the large states would control the national legislature. The resolution of that controversy resulted in
our present bicameral legislature, where one house is based on proportional representation and the other on uniform representation,
thus creating a power balance between the heavily populated and
sparsely populated states.158 Underlying the dispute between the
large and small states, however, was the assumption that in the
final analysis it would be the states which would determine how,
under what circumstances, and subject to what conditions the federal government would exercise its powers-powers ceded to it by the
once-supreme states. In short, the structure of the federal legislature insured, in an indirect manner at least, that no decision would
be made without deference to state desires. The further requirement of executive approval of any legislation and the fact that under
article II, section 1, the states, through the electoral college, chose
the executive provided, in theory at least, state control over all federal actions.
The single exception was the judiciary. Indeed it was in
response to just this lack of control over the judiciary that the antifederalists drafted a judiciary article providing that judges "may
be removed by the Executive on the application by the Senate and
'
House of Representatives."159
Thus in King it was not some outside
force-i.e., the federal court, over which the states have no control
(other than by impeachment)-which imposed the financial burden,
but rather the states which, at least in a theoretical sense, collectively
imposed these burdens on themselves through the legislative and
6
executive branches of the federal government.1 0
158. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 69-70, 91-112 (1913); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION

134-72, 220-365 (1928); cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 573-74 (1964).
159. C. WARREN, supra note 158, at 532.
160. It is admittedly somewhat difficult to rationalize this proposition with the
decision in Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
Involved there was a specific
statement by Congress that the states shall be subject to the provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, and yet the Court denied individuals the right to bring
any action to enforce those rights. What Congress did not do, however, was include in the Fair Labor Standards Act a private right of action against a state. Had
Congress done so, and had the Court in a challenge by the state held that there was
a violation of the eleventh amendment, then this proposition would be more suspect.
Even then, however, such a decision would be a retreat from previous indications
that Congress has the power to breach the states' eleventh amendment immunity.
See id.. at 283. But cf. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 200 (1968). In any event

1975)

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The same, however, can be said of Dandridge. The fourteenth
amendment was, in the first instance, a product of the federal legislature and thus an expression of the states' collective will. Why
then distinguish between one legislative expression and another?
Two answers are immediately apparent. First, as a practical matter, there is a difference between a specific programmatic decision,
and a universally applicable standard of due process or equal protection, the latter being more susceptible to judicial interpretation
than the former. Second, a court decision interpreting a statute in
a manner which impinges too heavily on the states can be reversed
A constitutional decision based either
by amending the statute.
on due process or, to a lesser extent, equal protection162 is more
difficult for the states, even collectively, to remedy. Rosado v.
Wyman163 stands as the principal statutory case in which state
sovereignty in general, 64 and the eleventh amendment in particuthe issue may be soon decided. The Court presently has before it a case testing
the constitutionality inter alia on eleventh amendment grounds of recent amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act providing that all state and municipal
employees be paid the minimum wage. See National League of Cities v. Dunlop,
419 U.S. 1100 (1974), reh. granted,421 U.S. 986 (1975).
161. Previously in the administration of public assistance was the question of
whether a state might terminate aid to a family when the mother did not reveal the
name of the father of an illegitimate child. The courts were nearly uniform in not
allowing states to terminate such aid. See, e.g., Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61
(N.D. Ill.), affd sub nom. Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 (1971); Meyer v. Juras, 327
F. Supp. 759 (D. Ore.), afj'd, 404 U.S. 803 (1971); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761
(D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970). In an effort to circumvent
these decisions some states attempted to eliminate only the noncooperating mother
from the aid grant. These attempts, too, were disapproved by the Court. See
Lascaris v. Shirley, 420 U.S. 730 (1975). See also Doe v. Gillman, 347 F. Supp. 482
(N.D. Iowa), modified, 479 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1973); Woods v. Miller, 318 F. Supp.
510 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed
399 U.S. 902 (1970).
The pressure, however, was too great. The Social Security Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337, amending 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1970), added
section 602(a)(26), which provides that states must, as part of their plan, provide for the
exclusion from the family budget of the needs of a mother who refuses to reveal the
name of the father of her illegitimate child.
162. Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due process grounds leaves
ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable. . . . Invocation of the Equal Protection Clause, on the other hand,
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at
hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a
broader impacL
REA v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
163. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
164. The State of Indiana filed a brief amicus curiae stating that for the Court to
interpret section 602(a)(23) of the Social Security Amendments of 1967 as requiring
the state to pay 100% of the updated standard of need would be a violation of state
sovereignty under the tenth amendment. Brief for State of Indiana amicus curiae
at 1-5, Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). The specific contention of sover-
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lar, was seriously raised.165 In its brief in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari 166 and its brief on the merits, 67 the
State of New York argued that a federal court interpretation of a
statute in a manner which required the states to appropriate additional dollars would be a direct violation of the eleventh amendment. After Employees, one would be hard-pressed to deny the
State's contention, at least in the abstract. However, in the context of a categorical grant program the argument evidences a
misconception of the issue. Even if the Court would have interpreted section 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Amendments of 1967
to require that states not only readjust the level of need to reflect
increased costs of living, but pay 100 percent of that need, no eleventh amendment problem would be raised since the states would always retain the ability to opt out of the federal program. Absent a
specific violation of the eleventh amendment, as occured in Edelman, the more general sovereignty question becomes a difficult
proposition to rationalize.
CONCLUSION

Lest what I have said be misconstrued, let me reiterate that I do
not like the result in Dandridge v. Williams. I do not believe that
any governmental body should be able to treat similarly situated
persons in a different manner without a compelling reason to do so.
If this means that the price of equality is greater than the price of inequality, then so be it. And if federal courts are the only institutions
which are capable of imposing a standard of equality, then they
ought not hesitate to do so any more in a case like Dandridge v.
Williams than in a case like Baker v. Carr.168 Certainly, the practical political ability of public assistance recipients to effect a change
eignty based on the tenth amendment is not new. Indeed it has been raised in
eleventh amendment litigation. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 203-05 (1968)
(dissenting opinion); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 304 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
165. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), was one of those cases which
seemingly goes on forever. The history of the case prior to the Supreme Court's
opinion takes 2 1/2 printed pages to set forth. Id. at 399-401. The Supreme Court
remand produced additional litigation both on the question of the disparity of payments between New York City and the rest of the State, and on the question of
compliance with section 602(a)(23) of the Social Security Amendments of 1967.
Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 437 F.2d 619 (2d Cir.
1970), af'd mem., 402 U.S. 991 (1971).
166. See Respondent's Brief against Certiorari at 23-24, Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397 (1970).
167. Brief for Respondent at 37-38, 59-62, Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
168. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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in their condition is no greater than that of the partially disenfranchised urban dweller. To the argument that Baker v. Carr involved
not only inequality of treatment, which was also involved in
Dandridge, but also inequality of treatment coupled with the fundamental right to vote, one need only recall Justice Marshall's dissent
in Dandridge, where he sarcastically remarked that "it is certainly
difficult to believe that a person whose very survival is at stake would
the knowledge that 'fundamental' rights are prebe comforted 1by
69
served intact."'
Yet, in another sense, it is just that statement which makes
Dandridge a more difficult case than the Court appeared willing to
admit. Both the majority and dissenting opinions project a certain
air of unreality. Both sets of opinions dealt with general constitutional principles which in context might be the subject of legitimate debate, but which somehow did not quite fit the specific facts
before the Court. These opinions somehow failed to recognize what
Professor Bennett articulated when writing of Dandridge and
Jefferson: "questions of discrimination and
personal liberty [were]
17
in issue, but money [was] really at stake."
In addition to this observation one point should be mentioned.
For better or worse, this country is a federal republic. There is no
one supreme government which, absent compelling circumstances,
can dictate to every other government. The federal courts do not
stand apart from that federal republic but are an essential part of it.
Indeed, they may well be the last insurer of the republic's
success. 171

What is most tragic about cases like Dandridge, in addition to
the result that now some welfare recipients are likely to starve more
than others, is the Court's approach to welfare programs evidenced
by the decision. The Court has carved out something called a
"social welfare program" without defining the parameters of that
term and has, in effect, determined that it will not review the manner
in which such a program is administered. 7 2 Under some circumstances that determination might be correct, not because the review
is of a social welfare program, but because regardless of the program, the harm being inflicted on the individual by the state is less

169. 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 n.14 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
170. Bennett, Liberty, Equality and Welfare Reform, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 74,
99 (1973).
171. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
172. For a criticism of this approach see Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1, 23 (1972). See also note 126 supra.
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than the harm or potential harm being inflicted on the state by the
federal government.
The proposition that the Court does or ought to insert into its decisionmaking process the consideration of state sovereignty begins to sound like a constitutional balancing based on the tenth
amendment. The purpose of this article, however, was not to resurrect, in substantive form, a constitutional provision which has been
described as little more than a truism. 7 3 Rather, the point is simply
that, compelled by a specific constitutional provision or not, the
Court is sensitive to the issue of state sovereignty. Indeed, cases
like Dandridge, Jefferson, and Rodriguez may be better understood
as sovereignty cases than as equal protection cases. More importantly, parties raising issues where the appropriation or allocation of
state dollars is the basic focus must be sensitive to the sovereignty
issue. The plaintiffs in Dandridge and Jefferson may have failed,
not because of a myopic Court but because they tried to push the
Constitution too hard and too fast. What resulted from the push
was an interpretation of the equal protection clause which will
plague welfare (and education) reformers for a long time to come.
173. Sperry v. Florida ex reL Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963). Even Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549-59 (1975), hedged on
the tenth amendment, preferring instead to use both it and the eleventh amendment
as illustrative of a broader notion of state sovereignty inherent in the constitutional
structure.

